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Fiscal Crisis  (Figure 1)
After climbing steadily for nearly a decade, a dramatic decline in per pupil 
revenue in 2012 sent the Philadelphia school district reeling.  
NOTE: Inflation-adjusted revenue per student includes charter school students and revenue paid out to charter schools.
SOURCE: School District of Philadelphia, Comprehensive Financial Report, June 30, 2013
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by JOHN CASKEY and MARK KUPERBERG
Each year, as predictably as classes end in 
June, the School District of Philadelphia faces a 
budget crisis for the coming school year. In 2014, 
the School Reform Commission, the school dis-
trict’s state-imposed governing body, for the first 
time and in violation of the city charter, refused to 
pass a budget, arguing that there were insufficient 
funds to run the schools responsibly. Philadelphia’s 
mayor Michael Nutter said, “It is a sad day in public 
service that we find children being held on the rail-
road tracks awaiting some rescue 
to come from somewhere.” And 
yet, casting the school children of 
Philadelphia in the Perils of Pauline 
has become a yearly ritual. 
In the summer of 2013, the dis-
trict superintendent announced 
that schools might not open on 
time, as severe budget cuts had led 
to insufficient staffing. The budgets 
of many individual schools allowed 
for no counselors, no secretar-
ies to assist principals or answer 
telephones, and no arts or sports programs. With 
a last-minute financial-aid pledge from the city, 
some laid-off personnel were recalled, and schools 
opened on time. But the district was still in such 
dire straits that Philadelphia’s newspapers launched 
a drive to obtain pencils, paper, and other basic 
supplies. This is no way to run a school system, 
much less the eighth largest in the United States.
We investigate why these school crises keep 
recurring. The most recent spate of crises actually 
started in the 2012 school year  (herein school years 
are referenced by the spring in which the school 
year ended). Between 2011 and 2012, the district 
cut almost 17 percent of its workforce, including 
nearly 2,000 teachers. How did the district get into 
this mess? Some people blame managers for failing 
to look ahead and budget carefully, 
in particular, for failing to plan for 
the predictable end of federal stimu-
lus funds. Structural factors have 
also been cited: It may be that the 
State of Pennsylvania does too little 
for public education. The City of 
Philadelphia may either tax itself too 
lightly or allocate too much money 
to other city services at the expense 
of the school district. Some of the 
financial burden may be the result 
of student flight to charter schools, 
whose share of Philadelphia students has grown 
dramatically in recent years. We find supporting 
evidence for all of these explanations. We also find 
that the crisis was certainly not due to excessive 
spending relative to that of surrounding districts (see 
sidebar on page 24 for details on city support, charter 
Why the  
district  
has a money 
problem
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school enrollments, district spending, and teacher 
salaries). We conclude that the unwieldy process 
for financing the district mean that such crises are 
bound to recur unless that process is changed.
Funding the Philadelphia Schools
Three specific events triggered the 2012 crisis: an 
abrupt reduction in federal and state funding (see 
Figure 1), the inability of the district to cut many 
of its costs, and political pressures on the district 
to spend available revenues in a given year. 
In response to an earlier financial crisis, in 
2001, the State of Pennsylvania took control of 
the Philadelphia school district. The Republican governor at 
the time worked with the Democratic mayor of Philadelphia 
to arrange a “friendly” takeover, which replaced the local 
school board with a five-member School Reform Commission 
(SRC). Three members are appointed by the governor and 
two by the mayor. 
With no independent taxing authority, the district depends 
for funding on annual allocations from the city, state, and 
federal governments. Of the district’s $2.7 billion in revenues 
in 2013, 50 percent came from the state and 14 percent from 
the federal government; city and local contributions made 
up the remainder. In a typical year, the governor presents 
a draft state budget to the legislature in February, including 
allocations for K–12 education. In April, the district uses the 
governor’s proposed budget and estimates what it will get from 
the city to prepare its own draft budget. Much of the funding 
the School District of Philadelphia gets from the city is fairly 
predictable, but it must nevertheless appear before the city 
council in May to present a request for funds. 
From the perspective of the district, multiple sources of 
funding create three significant planning problems. First, the 
state legislature can alter the governor’s proposed budget. 
Second, the city council may not grant the district’s request 
for funds, especially any requests that go beyond its typical 
allocations. When the allocations from the state and city 
deviate from what the district expects, it must adjust its bud-
get. Third, there is a “who goes first?” problem. In years when 
the district appeals to the state and city for additional funding, 
each is reluctant to pledge new funds without knowing how 
much the other will commit. If one governmental entity steps 
up, this reduces the burden on the laggard. Such gaming 
between the city and state can leave the district uncertain 
about its exact funding until well into its fiscal year. 
When the recession began in late 2007, it severely reduced 
tax revenues at all levels of government. In order to preserve 
jobs and maintain educational spending, the federal govern-
ment in early 2009 initiated an economic stimulus program. 
About $113 million a year in 2010 and 2011 came directly 
from the federal government to the school district, mainly 
as supplemental grants to enhance educational services for 
disadvantaged students. Other stimulus funds went to the 
state to allocate to school districts. 
In 2010, the state faced reduced revenues and cut its 
own support for K–12 education but used the stimulus 
funds to increase overall allocations to school districts. For 
Philadelphia, combined state and federal funding grew by 10.2 
percent. Local funding for the district declined by 0.7 percent, 
but given the large share of state and federal funding, overall 
district revenues still grew by 6.7 percent. 
The subsequent fiscal year was similar, but the growth 
in revenues was more constrained. Funding to the district 
from state-generated revenues was essentially flat, but federal 
funding increased by 13.3 percent, largely due to the stimulus 
package. Local funding fell by 2 percent. On net, the district’s 
total revenues grew by 2 percent. This modest increase created 
budget pressures for the school district that required some 
midyear cuts, but the district managed to end the fiscal year 
with a small surplus. 
District administrators clearly understood that the district’s 
budget was heavily dependent on the state’s basic education 
subsidy, and that the state had increased this subsidy in fiscal 
years 2010 and 2011 by using federal stimulus funding. In 
2010 and early 2011, district management warned repeatedly 
that severe cuts would have to be made if the state or the 
city did not increase support for K–12 education once the 
federal stimulus funding ended in 2011. Arlene Ackerman, 
Of the district’s $2.7 billion in revenues in 2013, 50 percent came from the state and  
14 percent from the federal government; city and local contributions made up the remainder.
Pennsylvania governor Tom Corbett signs the 2013–14 state budget on 
June 30, 2013
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who became superintendent in 2008 but would be forced out 
in 2011, emphasized two factors that she thought might win 
over legislators who were demanding greater school choice 
and more accountability from traditional schools. Ackerman 
pointed to the district’s support for the growing numbers of 
students selecting charter schools and to rising test scores by 
district students on the state’s standardized tests. 
Spending Cuts
Political developments did not provide much hope for addi-
tional state funding, however. In November 2010, voters 
elected Tom Corbett, a Republican, as governor, replacing 
Ed Rendell, a Democrat. In addition, the Republican Party 
gained control of both houses of the state legislature. Corbett 
and many Republican state legislators had run on a “no new 
tax” pledge. With the state still mired in the recession and the 
end of federal stimulus funding, Corbett clearly had to cut 
state spending to balance the budget.
The school district could not know exactly what Corbett 
planned to do with the education budget, but it recognized 
that a big increase in state funding to offset the elimination of 
federal stimulus funding was unlikely. Almost immediately after 
Corbett’s election, the School District of Philadelphia began 
to make plans for how it might adjust to major budget cuts. 
But the governor surprised the district (and school districts 
throughout the state) in March 2011 when he proposed a state 
budget that cut support for basic education by nearly 10 percent. 
The termination of almost $1 billion in federal stimulus funding 
for education in Pennsylvania was to be offset by only a very 
modest replacement by the state. After heavy lobbying by school 
districts around the state, Corbett and the state legislature settled 
on a 7 percent cut in the basic education subsidy, but they also 
made deep cuts to other state grants for education. Reductions 
in state funding fell disproportionately on Philadelphia. The 
district, which educates about 10 percent of the state’s children, 
shouldered about 30 percent of the state cuts. 
For Philadelphia, the end of the stimulus and the state’s 
decision to offset only a small share of the federal cuts meant 
a 14 percent drop in state and federal education funding 
between 2011 and 2012. As the magnitude of the coming 
funding cuts materialized, the district appealed to the city for 
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Revenue Shortfall  (Figure 2)
Despite rising over the decade, district revenues fell by 7 percent in 2012 when other funding failed to fully replace federal 
funds provided by the stimulus package.
SOURCE: School District of Philadelphia, Comprehensive Financial Report, June 30, 2013
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Philadelphia’s Support for Education
Many observers argue that the district is underfunded relative to its needs. This raises the question, is the City of Philadelphia 
doing its fair share to fund its schools? 
Figure S1 plots “local tax effort” as a function of “economic capacity” for the district and surrounding suburban districts. We 
use suburban Philadelphia as the comparison group because labor costs are the overwhelming component of a school district’s 
expenditures, and labor markets in education are local. We also include Pittsburgh, the state’s second-largest city. Pittsburgh 
has more than double the economic capacity of Philadelphia ($320,844 vs. $150,776 per student).
Philadelphia’s position in Figure S1 indicates that its tax effort for education is about average for the metropolitan region, and is 
similar to Pittsburgh’s. But Philadelphia’s relatively large distance from the line indicates that its financial support for education is low 
compared to most other low-wealth districts. Had the city funded the district according to what would be predicted by the regression 
line, Philadelphia’s contribution would have been 25.3 percent higher, generating $237 million in 2012, enough to have offset 80 per-
cent of the decline in state and federal funding that year. 
Charter Schools
Growing enrollment in charter schools is another factor in the district’s financial woes. State law requires districts to give charter schools 
the same amount per pupil, roughly speaking, that traditional schools spent per pupil in the previous year, adjusted for the difference 
between spending on regular and special 
education students. 
As the recession began, total enroll-
ment in the city’s public schools had been 
declining for several years from enroll-
ment of about 212,000 in 2003. While by 
2009 total enrollment had hit a plateau at 
just under 200,000, district school enroll-
ment continued to decline as increasing 
numbers of students chose to attend 
charter schools. Charter school enroll-
ment rose from 30,350 in 2007 to 61,740 
in 2013, as district school enrollment fell 
from 169,697 to 136,929. Charter schools 
currently educate 30 percent of public 
school students in the district.
In theory, charter schools are cost-
neutral because they remove students from 
the district and the associated operating 
costs in equal measure. In reality they are 
not. Students rarely leave a traditional 
public school in a quantity and grade level 
that allows for the elimination of a class-
room, so it may be impossible in the short 
run to lower teacher costs in line with the 
reduction in students. And some operating 
expenses, such as those for principals and 
building maintenance, cannot be reduced 
unless an entire school is eliminated, which 
is also difficult to achieve in the short run.   
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(Figure S1)
In 2012, Philadelphia’s local tax effort was less than what would be predicted 
by its economic capacity and below average relative to most other low-
wealth districts. 
NOTES: Equalized mills is a measure of local tax effort that reflects all locally generated tax revenue 
divided by the district’s total property market value. Economic capacity is measured as a weighted 
average of a district’s total personal income and property market value per student; 60 percent of the 
weight is determined by market value of taxable property per student and the remaining 40 percent by 
personal income.
SOURCE: Pennsylvania Department of Education
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District Spending
Figure S2 compares per-pupil current 
expenditures in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, 
and Philadelphia’s Pennsylvania sub-
urbs. It shows that Philadelphia spends 
far less than the suburban districts, 
but roughly in line with its economic 
capacity. Only a handful of suburban 
districts spend less than Philadelphia. 
Pittsburgh spends far more per pupil 
than Philadelphia—in fact, Pittsburgh 
is the second-highest-spending school 
district in the comparison group.  
The contract approved in early 2010 
gave teachers a 3 percent raise in Sep-
tember 2010 and a 3 percent raise in 
January 2012, in addition to a 4 percent 
raise received in March 2009. These 
increases raise the question of whether 
district teachers are overpaid. As Table 
S1 shows, in 2013 the average teacher 
salary in Philadelphia was 5.3 percent 
lower than the average in surrounding 
suburbs, and 3.6 percent lower than 
in Pittsburgh, where the cost of living 
is substantially less. Philadelphia does 
pay its administrators more, but they 
are managing a school district that is 
7 times larger than Pittsburgh’s and 10 
times larger than the largest suburban 
school district.
Differences in employment benefits 
close some of the compensation gap. 
In Philadelphia, teachers do not con-
tribute anything toward the cost of 
health insurance for themselves and 
their dependents. Available data for 
surrounding suburbs from a National 
Council on Teacher Quality report, 
Teacher Quality Roadmap: Improving 
Policies and Practices in the School 
District of Philadelphia, indicate that it 
was common for suburban teachers to 
pay $1,000 to $2,000 in 2013 for family 
health insurance. 
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But Philadelphia teachers’ pay is below the average of the surrounding suburbs 
and below the average in Pittsburgh.
Note: Current expenditures include spending on instruction, support services, and operations of non-
instructional services but exclude facilities acquisitions and debt financing.
SOURCE: Pennsylvania Department of Education
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Pennsylvania Department of Education
 Administrators Teachers
Other  
Professional 
Staff
All  
Professional 
Staff
Suburban  
Philadelphia $122,279 $74,706 $80,485 $77,635
Pittsburgh $109,058 $73,483 $83,233 $76,274
Philadelphia $129,574 $70,790 $74,143 $73,548
School Spending in Philadelphia, Its Suburbs, and  
Pittsburgh  (Figure S2)
Spending per student in Philadelphia is lower than in most of its suburbs, and far 
lower than in Pittsburgh.
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additional revenues to help it head off drastic disruptions to 
its educational program. The city responded by increasing its 
funding and other local revenue to the district by 11.3 percent. 
The net result, however, was an almost 7 percent decline in 
district revenue (see Figure 2). 
Limited Options
The school district had to cut spending, but much of the 
district’s budget is fixed in the short run. Collective bargaining 
agreements set the scale for salaries and benefits. The federal 
government mandates certain levels of special education ser-
vices. State law and enrollments govern how much the district 
must transfer to charter schools. School buildings must be 
heated and maintained. Bond issuances determine required 
debt payments. In fact, the district estimates that between 66 
and 80 percent of its expenses are predetermined from one 
year to the next, and many of these costs, such as negotiated 
wage contracts, increase automatically. Thus, the 7 percent 
decline in total operating revenues in fiscal year 2012 fell 
heavily on a small portion of the overall budget. 
The largest component of educational expenditure is person-
nel, so it is not surprising that the district looked to the workforce 
for potential cuts. Between 2003 and 2009, district employment 
of classroom teachers had declined, but the student-to-teacher 
ratio had held relatively stable as the district lost students to 
charters and other schools. In 2010 and 2011, the district added 
teachers while continuing to lose students, and student-to-
teacher ratios dropped dramatically. But when the stimulus 
funding ended and the state failed to replace those funds, the 
district decided to cut its workforce by almost 17 percent (see 
Figure 3), which would save more than $300 million annually. 
The district also netted one-time savings of well over $100 
million, mainly from a debt refinancing, and it pushed some 
expenses into the subsequent fiscal year. It delayed $42 mil-
lion in payments into a union health plan and borrowed 
$35 million from the regional transportation authority. Such 
measures simply postponed the need for additional cuts. 
The tight financial situation continued into 2013, but the 
district avoided significant cuts that year by borrowing $302 
million in the bond market. Much of this went to cover the 
short-term debts the district had incurred in the previous year. 
Recognizing that it could not continue to borrow to cover 
operating costs, the SRC announced that it would close almost 
10 percent of the district’s 240 schools in 2013. For several years, 
the SRC had been closing schools, but well below the rate the 
schools were losing students. Every announced school closing 
was vociferously contested by supporters of that school. 
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Fiscal constraints and declining enrollments forced a 15 percent reduction in the teaching force in 2012, but student-to-
teacher ratios remained below 2009 levels.
SOURCE: School District of Philadelphia, Comprehensive Financial Report, June 30, 2013
The largest component of educational expenditure is personnel,  
so it is not surprising that the district looked to the workforce for potential cuts.
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In 2013 the relatively new superintendent, William R. Hite, 
announced that schools might not open on time if they could 
not be adequately staffed. Committed to a balanced budget, Hite 
and the SRC put forth a “doomsday” budget that severely cut the 
number of noontime aides, counselors, and teachers, and created 
“split” classrooms, that is, classrooms with two grade levels in the 
same room. That summer, the district mailed layoff notices to 
nearly 3,800 employees. At the same time, the SRC asked the city 
for $60 million in additional funding, the state for $120 million, 
and its unions for $133 million in labor concessions. The city 
pledged to find $50 million in additional revenue for the schools. 
Exactly how the city would come up with this money was still to 
be determined, but the pledge was sufficient for the district to 
reinstate 1,600 laid-off employees and open on schedule. 
Could the Crisis  
Have Been Avoided? 
Critics of the district management 
argue that the administration should 
have cut costs in order to conserve 
resources and prepare for the pre-
dictable end of the stimulus money, 
even when, relatively speaking, fund-
ing was flush. It certainly did not do 
this. When the district had sufficient 
funds prior to 2011, it agreed to a 
series of wage increases for union 
employees, added remedial summer-
school classes, reduced class sizes, 
operated underutilized buildings, 
and devoted extra resources to 
improve poorly performing schools. 
Some of these measures could be 
quickly reversed, but some created 
ongoing commitments.  
People who defend the district’s 
spending prior to the crisis point 
to a number of institutional and 
political realities. For one, the fed-
eral stimulus funding that came directly to the district had 
to be used for program enhancements, that is, the district 
had very limited legal ability to “bank” the funds. Moreover, 
graduation rates in the district are strikingly low, as is student 
performance on standardized tests. SRC members and state 
and local politicians naturally pushed the district to improve 
these metrics. The school district’s response was to spend 
available funds on initiatives that might help in the short run, 
even if it left the district vulnerable in the long run. And, as 
noted earlier, the district must approach the state and city 
each year with its hat in hand to ask for resources. If it did 
so while banking previously appropriated funds, this would 
undermine its case. Finally, prior to the November 2010 
election, the district assumed that the state would largely 
replace the federal funding that the state used to maintain its 
support for K–12 education during the recession. It did not 
anticipate that the state would continue its reduced level of 
funding and cut state grants to the district. But once federal 
stimulus funding ended and the state and city refused to 
step up, the district was, like the Coyote in the Road Runner 
cartoon, standing on thin air. 
Conclusion
Despite a vibrant downtown, Philadelphia is a much 
poorer city than many people realize. With one-quarter of 
its residents living below the poverty level, Philadelphia is 
the ninth-poorest U.S. city with a 
population over 250,000. Relative 
to Pittsburgh and the Philadelphia 
suburbs, the school district is sig-
nificantly underfunded by the state 
and its city government, especially 
when one adjusts for the compara-
tively large percentages of special 
education, English language learn-
ers, and low-income students. In 
short, the district faces huge chal-
lenges with limited resources.  
In addition to this fundamen-
tal fiscal weakness, the district is 
undermined by its governance 
structure. With no independent 
taxing authority, every year the 
district administration must 
plead for funding from the state 
and city. As with the boy who 
cried wolf, the politicians who 
hear the message repeatedly 
become skeptical. In addition, the 
city and state have an incentive to 
delay committing funds as long as 
possible in the hope that the other will take the lead.
In the summer of 2014, the district once again faces a dire 
fiscal situation and is appealing to the city and state to rescue 
the schools. The danger is that the district may have entered 
a vicious cycle in which persistent financial crises encour-
age more parents to leave the city or move their children to 
charter schools, further undermining the district’s financing 
and reinforcing the exodus of students.   
John Caskey and Mark Kuperberg are professors in the 
department of economics at Swarthmore College. Erica Kouka 
provided research assistance.
Philadelphia school district superintendent William R. 
Hite speaks about the proposed fiscal year 2015 operating 
budget at a press conference on April 25, 2014
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